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Adolescence and Religious Fundamentalism  
In her keynote address to the Kristeva Circle 2014, Julia Kristeva argued 
that European Humanism dating from the French Revolution paradoxically 
paved the way for “those who use God for political ends” by promoting a 
completely and solely secular path to the political.1  As an unintended result 
of this movement, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen the 
development of a new form of nihilism that masks itself as revolutionary but 
in fact is the opposite, in Kristeva’s view.  Analyzing the culture of religious 
fundamentalism as “adolescent” in the sense that the adolescent, in contrast 
to the child, is a believer rather than a questioner, Kristeva gave a fascinating 
analysis of the religious devotee as well as the mystic and the lover as 
adolescents, not in the sense of being immature so much as in their capacity 
to hold on to a static fantasy that is passionately and protractedly believed to 
be true.  We are all adolescents when we are in love, according to Kristeva, 
just as the Judeo-Christian paradise is an “adolescent” creation (though not 
the creation of adolescents).   Although the psychoanalytic consideration of 
religious fundamentalism added a new dimension to attempts to explain the 
increase of this phenomenon in the late 20th and 21st centuries, Kristeva’s 
subsequent linkage of fundamentalism to the revolts in French suburbs in 
2005 and beyond fell short of an insightful critique.   
Kristeva calls the adolescent a “believer of the object relation and/or of 
its impossibility.”2  The object relation in psychoanalysis is a relation to an 
object of need, whether real or imagined.  In its early development the child 
builds up object relations in response to an initially inchoate but dawning 
awareness of its separation from the mother or caregiver, in particular in the 
context of her provisional and progressively lengthier absence as the child 
grows older.   Kristeva follows the Kleinian idea that the initial or proto-
object of the child, as a result of this progressive separation, is a schizoid 
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one, split into a good or idealized “mother” part-object who provides 
everything for the child, and a bad part-object perceived as the one who 
abandons the child for periods of time.3  Serving as a mediator between 
these two objects, Kristeva indicates a Freudian theme that often recurs 
within her writings, that of the child’s primary identification with the 
imaginary “father” external to what she calls the “horror of the dual 
interdependence of the mother and the child,” the one (male or female) who 
loves and is loved by the mother.4  This father is not an object per se, but 
rather makes separation between ego and object possible in the first place.  
Through recognition of and identification with this imaginary one in whom 
the mother has “invested” the symbolic identity of the child, the stammering 
of the child is eventually transformed into linguistic signs, and the good and 
bad mothers are unified into one, more complex entity or object.  
Kristeva recalls the Sanskrit root of the word “credit,” khred, which is 
also the root of the Latin credo, “I believe.”5  This investment in a figure 
outside the mother-child bond, in a not-yet phallic Other who is the object of 
the mother’s desire outside her bond to the child, and to whom the “I” of the 
future subject responds, is a sine qua non of subjectivity.  Without recognition 
from or investment in this other, the “I” cannot come into being.  The Third 
(Tiers), as this “father of individual prehistory” is also known, is neither a 
“father” representing the linguistic and law-given order nor a care-giver 
“mother,” nor a determinate object of faith or belief.  Rather, in specific 
contrast to the fused nurturing bond with the mother, this figure of a “loving 
father” is a guarantor of the child’s transition to a more stable, independent, 
and flexible, intersubjective identity.  
Along with the language of love and belief, the economic or financial 
language of investment and credit is central to this account.  In addition to 
linking “credit” to “belief” etymologically, Kristeva describes the “incredible 
need to believe” as grounding an expectation of restitution in the form of 
divine favor accorded to the faithful:  “I set down a good and await my 
pay.”6  This “expectant believing” (gläubige Erwartung) implies trust, 
recognition, and reciprocity, the last being both intersubjective and material.  
For the “investment” to be successful, it must provide a return, a profit. 
In order for this to happen, the original bond with the Third first 
assures creditworthiness.  When the child invests in early life in this loving 
father, primordial angst is transformed into a primary identification that is 
“direct and immediate,” constructed neither by the child nor by the father of 
individual pre-history.7  Properly speaking, this is the investment that 
enables all subsequent investment, the moment of extending credit tout 
court.  
Kristeva describes this moment of investment as fulfilling a “pre-
religious need to believe” in a “truth that keeps me, makes me exist,”8 a 
belief in the “God Logos,” as Freud called it in The Future of an Illusion. The 
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subject can only eventually become speaking and intersubjective if a 
“beloved authority” first acknowledges her9 and receives her capacity for 
meaning, however inchoate it may initially be.  The assurance of 
creditworthiness responds to this pre-religious, pre-social need for 
investment.   
Subsequently, with the Kleinian “depressive” position, the child 
gradually becomes reconciled to the progressive absence of the mother and 
learns to turn to a broader social sphere to “rediscover” her in symbolic life, 
resulting in an attachment to an object that is less alienated than in the initial 
schizoid position, and, ideally, an identification with a broader social and 
ethical sphere.  Language and social recognition are the rewards for the shift 
away from the mother and toward the “paternal” realm.  
However, this process can and does go awry when creditworthiness is 
not firmly established, either due to a caregiver who is distant or cold, or a 
Third who turns out to be unreliable.  Rather than receiving credit and being 
invested into an indeterminate identification with symbolic allegiance per se, 
the child, unmoored, may turn instead to a determinate and fixed object of 
adherence.  Mistrust of parental authority may be a normal dimension of 
adolescence, to be followed by progressive integration into the adult world 
and reconciliation with the parental figures.  However, in the case of fixation 
at the adolescent stage, there may be a turn instead to an “ideal object” in 
place of the parental figures and what they represent.  In her essay 
“Adolescence: A Syndrome of Ideality,” Kristeva writes that what allows the 
adolescent to escape childhood is her conviction that there is another 
unwavering ideal beyond the imperfect parental bond, whether a romantic 
partner or a political or ideological ideal.10  According to Freud, idealization 
is a result of the splitting of the narcissistic actual ego when it enters into 
conflict with pre-existing cultural and ethical ideas.  The actual ego, as a 
result of this conflict, divides into an offending part that is repressed and 
another part that is set up within the self as an ideal by which to measure the 
ego.11  
The turn toward a Great Other, a “God” (in a “pre-religious” sense) that 
cannot disappoint, or to pleasure or love itself, that is, to a belief that this 
ideal exists and can be attained—a belief that is nonetheless continually 
under threat—characterizes adolescence, according to Kristeva.  The 
adolescent separates from parental figures and replaces them with a new 
model, “rush[ing] toward a new love that will open the doors to new 
paradises” surpassing them.12  Kristeva goes further than Freud in 
indicating that the process of splitting the ego into a repressed unconscious 
on the one hand and an ego ideal on the other has gone awry in a very 
specific way in the late 20th century, resulting in a “deep disorganization of 
the self” in which the “I” is replaced by an “unbinding drive ready to go to 
any extreme.”  There results a “de-objectification” in which “the other has 
neither meaning nor value,” where “the death drive alone, the malignity of 
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evil, triumphs.”  We thus find ourselves today facing a new kind of radical 
evil. 13   
What is this new kind of radical evil, which is presumably different 
from the evil considered by Arendt in her discussion in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, upon which Kristeva, albeit in a very abbreviated way, is 
clearly drawing?  Kristeva writes that adolescent objects of passion 
inevitably disappoint: lovers turn out to be flawed and unreliable, paradises 
after death are unverifiable, political-ideological programs are revealed as 
imperfect, and humans are often unable to sustain the emptying out of 
mental activity that mysticism, another seemingly indeterminate but 
actually fixed alternative idealization, seems to demand.  When the 
adolescent object of devotion fails, this may lead to depression, boredom, 
and aggression or even destructiveness.  Yet, the “adolescent” still wants to 
hold on to something that will not fail, and, in Kristeva’s view, this can 
increase the attraction of fundamentalist religious programs that combine 
elements of the great Other’s idealized form.   She writes that “the slightest 
disappointment of this ideality syndrome” casts the adolescent “into the 
ruins of paradise and leads him towards delinquent conduct.”14  
 Kristeva writes that in the last two hundred years the interrogation of 
values (childhood) has in an increasingly global manner been transformed 
into an eternal (perpetual or terminal) adolescence (complete rejection of all 
old values) in the name of a pseudo-revolution, one which proscribes all 
questioning of its nihilistic stance.  The human “incredible” religious need to 
believe has been replaced, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, by 
“ideological enthusiasm,” to the extent that the death drive has been 
encouraged to “shift into high gear.”15  
This psychoanalytical account of the phenomenon of religious 
fundamentalism’s attraction and its periodic violent outbursts adds 
complexity to accounts of religiously motivated terrorism that would trace it 
to pure irrationalism or simple rejection of cultural values.  We can see this 
phenomenon not only in suicide bombings, to which Kristeva seemed to 
primarily allude in this quotation, but also in the increasing militarization 
and anti-government rhetoric of some fundamentalist Christian groups in 
the United States, and in sectarian violence in India and Iraq, among other 
places. 
However, Kristeva went a step further to touch on what she called the 
“suburban troubles” in Marseille and elsewhere in France.  Kristeva argued 
that the “delinquency of ‘disadvantaged teens’ in France in fact reveals a 
more radical phase of nihilism, a phase taking place beneath the ‘clash of 
religions,’” at the level of the lack of response to the pre-religious need to 
believe.   She characterized the destructive behavior of the rioters within “so-
called suburban troubles” as the actions of a paradoxical figure she called a 
“nihilist believer.”  The nihilist believer, she writes, is the result of 
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disconnection and desocialization within the “ruthlessness of global 
migration.”  The result is “adolescent gangster fundamentalism” that is 
“ready to go to any extreme.”16  
It is true that in an interview with Carmine Donzelli, Kristeva clarifies, 
as she did not in her talk to the Kristeva Circle, that “the crisis of our 
suburbs” is not religious, “nor is it aimed a posteriori against ‘the not-
displaying-any-signs-of-religious-affiliation rule’,” namely, the well 
publicized ban on Islamic headscarves and veils for women.  She also 
acknowledges that the destructive actions of the “pyromaniacs” and 
“incendiaries” displays a “need for recognition” and reveals “suffering” in 
the “battle against discrimination.”17  
In a few offhand remarks in her talk, however, Kristeva nevertheless 
seemed to conflate the unrest in French suburbs with Islamic terrorism, in 
particular with suicide bombing, when she described youth as being 
“incapable of distinguishing good from evil” and ready to “sink into blind 
destructivity and finally auto-destruction.”18  Kristeva’s analysis appeared 
to be superficially drawing on that of Hannah Arendt, but she omitted 
Arendt’s careful historical analysis and thus made some hasty and even 
dangerous implications. Despite admitting to a distinction between a “clash 
of values…produced by divergent or competing libidinal interests,” on the 
one hand, and “extreme evil, which sweeps away the sense of distinction 
between good and evil itself,” on the other, she still seemed to align the 
“new radical evil” with both the French suburban unrest and with auto-
destructive terrorism in general. In addition, by attributing both these forms 
of "evil" to a vaguely generalized "ruthless global migration" Kristeva 
unmoored her account from any historical genealogy. 
Colonialism and its Aftermath 
Had Arendt lived to witness these events in France and elsewhere in the 
world in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, she might not have descried in 
them a completely new type of evil.  This is because a line between auto-
destructive terrorism and the uprisings in France can only be drawn, as 
Kristeva seems to want to do, if we also consider it in relation to the 
colonialism that predated and produced it, in such a way that, as Arendt 
writes, “some of the fundamental aspects of [the period of Imperialist 
scramble for Africa] appear so close to totalitarian phenomena of the 
twentieth century that it may be justifiable to consider the whole period a 
preparatory stage for coming catastrophes.”19  
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt describes Algeria, colonized by 
France in the late nineteenth century, as  “the nonsensical hybrid of a 
nominally French territory legally as much a part of France as the 
Département de la Seine, whose inhabitants are not French Citizens.”20  This 
description could almost fit the situation today of Algerian and other North 
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African immigrants to France, even if they have sometimes gained French 
citizenship.   
Tracing the history of French colonization of Africa, Arendt writes that 
“the French Empire actually was evaluated from the point of view of 
national defense, and the colonies were considered lands of soldiers which 
could produce a force noire to protect the inhabitants of France against their 
national enemies.”  She quotes Poincaré’s famous dictum of 1923 praising 
the discovery in African soldiers of an “’economical form of gunfodder, 
turned out by mass-production methods.’”21  
Fast forward to 2005, when more than two million African immigrants, 
directly as a result of French colonization of North and East Africa, now live 
in France, largely in suburban communities with inferior social services.  As 
Justin Smith notes, “Francophone Africans do not choose to come to France 
on a whim, but because of a long history of imposed Frenchness at home.”22  
The majority come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, countries with 
majority Islamic populations.  It is not religious concerns that cause most 
unrest in these "suburban troubles," but rather unemployment and 
discrimination and a de facto second class citizen status.   
In 2005, famously, the first riots in Clichy-sous-bois, a suburban housing 
project northeast of Paris with a large immigrant population, were set off by 
the deaths by electrocution of 15-year-old Bouna Traoré and his friend, 17-
year-old Zyed Benna, who fled and hid in an electric relay station when they 
were chased by police in an apparent case of racial profiling.   The 
subsequent outrage, which included both relatively peaceful mass protests 
and destructive actions such as setting cars ablaze, clearly reflected 
perceived class and racial discrimination, but had no clear connection to 
religion.  Instead, news reports indicate that anger over poor housing 
conditions, racial profiling by the police, inadequate basic public services, 
and, in the years since the incident, no prosecution of the police who caused 
the incident, were the primary reasons for dissatisfaction among residents of 
this and other suburbs.   
The city of Marseille, which Kristeva particularly referenced in her talk, 
has also had its share of violence, but most of it has been a result of 
unemployment, gang warfare, and drug trafficking.   Unemployment is 
particularly high in Marseille for youth descended from North African 
immigrants, who are treated as second-class citizens.  According to one 
account, employers are loath to hire even well-qualified job applicants if 
they have the wrong ethnicity or an address in the wrong part of a city 
divided according to class and ethnic background.23  Nevertheless, Marseille 
was spared the worst of the rioting that swept across France after the events 
in Clichy-sous-bois, and has a history of fewer crimes motivated by religious 
belief.24  The reasons for the unrest are complex and always involve multiple 
factors, but socio-economic injustice and racial segregation are widely cited 
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by reputable journalists and scholars as the primary motivation, even if 
religious fundamentalism is sometimes blamed in popular opinion. 
As historian Robert Aldrich notes, in June 2005, before the riots, a 
French news magazine published an article that was presciently titled 
“Suburbs: A Colonial Problem?,” reporting on a group that called 
themselves the indigènes de la République, who protested that the French 
republic was not one of equality, and that descendants of immigrants from 
countries colonized by France, notably North African countries, were the 
victims of systematic racial discrimination and  economic 
disenfranchisement and exploitation.  These children and grandchildren of 
workers recruited from the colonies in the 1960’s and 1970’s have never been 
fully integrated into French culture. 
The historical linkage of colonialism, fascism, and terrorism results in 
an evil that is not so much categorically new as a continuation of the same in 
various new forms.  The evocation of a kind of “evil incarnate” without 
historical lineage resides, as Derek Gregory points out, in the Hegelian 
“innocent gaze” that perceives evil all around but not in itself.25  It focuses 
on the few angry perpetrators of a heinous crime while masking the 
suffering and dispossession of thousands to which it responds.  It is 
important conceptually to separate the uprisings in France from suicide 
bombings linked to the conflict between Palestine and Israel, not because 
they have completely different origins, since both phenomena are rooted in 
economic and political concerns, but because they take different forms.  
Whereas in France the legacy of colonialism has resulted in a two-tier system 
of the rights of the citizen, whether French or of a country formerly 
colonized by France, in Palestine the human is not a citizen at all.  The level 
of violence of the form that resistance to the colonizing power takes reflects 
this difference in identity.  Furthermore, while resistance to this 
phenomenon may or may not be played out in the name of religion, religion 
is fundamentally supplemental to political and economic concerns, not the 
primary motivation for the violence.  The compulsion to self-destruct while 
destroying others cannot be traced to an incredible need to believe in a 
religious sense, but rather to a complete lack of investment from the other.   
Again, Arendt is instructive.  Writing in 1941, she deplores the 
emergence of “a new class of people in Europe, the stateless.”26  The Jewish 
question, after the war, was solved “by means of a colonized and then 
conquered territory” which then produced a new category of refugees, the 
Arabs, “thereby increasing the number of the stateless and rightless.”27  
Arabs were given the choice “between voluntary emigration or second class 
citizenship.”28  According to Arendt, “no conflicts can be solved within the 
framework of a colonial system, no matter what form it takes.”29  
What Kristeva fails to include in her analysis is the complicity of 
France—not because of its secularism, which she addresses and denies is at 
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the heart of the problem, but rather in the form of the legacy of its colonial 
empire—in the problems that it now faces, primarily in terms of its 
“suburban troubles,” but also to the degree that it shares in the pain of 
global terrorism.  Even the current spate of suicide bombings, techniques 
that originated in Russia in the nineteenth century, must in turn be traced to 
the desperation of a people who have already been divested of almost 
everything, including state citizenship, and who struggle with possibilities 
that have been stripped down to the bare minimum.  If one’s life is worth 
nothing, if one has no civic identity, it may well be extinguished in the name 
of something better, whether worldly or otherwise.30  While Kristeva’s 
analysis focuses on the individual unmoored from recognition, she might 
have also turned to the imaginary “father,” who in this case is unloving. 
This is because another Third operates historically in France and in the 
world, namely, the Third World (tiers monde), a term coined in 1952 by the 
French demographer Alfred Sauvy as a warning that poor countries would 
get lost in the Cold War.  Sauvy wrote, “After all, this Third World — 
ignored, exploited, scorned like the Third Estate — wants to be something, 
too.”31  The term “third world” also recalls the pre-revolution Third of the 
French Third Estate (tiers-état), consisting of the “commoners,” or all those 
who belonged neither to the nobility nor to the clergy.  Although the 
analysis of the riots in terms of a terminal adolescence would seem to place 
equal or greater responsibility for this situation on the “parent,” Kristeva 
pointed instead, disappointingly, to the power of a ghostly Third of religious 
fundamentalism, as being at the origin of the nihilistic destruction that 
results from disappointed adherence, investment without a satisfactory 
return. 
Given Kristeva’s celebration of a kind of migrant subjectivity that 
intentionally crosses boundaries in a constant attempt to reinvent or 
transform oneself, her vague critique of global migration and her implicit 
self-alignment with French nationality is surprising.  It was interesting and 
dismaying that Kristeva did not even mention or seemingly consider the 
legacy of French colonialism in Africa in her discussion of the “suburban 
troubles” in France.  Although this omission allowed her to develop her 
argument about the relationship between adolescence and the appeal of a 
seemingly unwavering ideal, her conclusion did not fit the facts in France or 
accord with her usual careful scholarship.   Investing in a chimera, Kristeva 
turned away from the abject history of her own adopted nation.   She 
seemed to disregard the fact that in the development of the adolescent, it is 
the parents who must take responsibility in large part for successful 
socialization. 
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